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 ABSTRACT 
 
Research has demonstrated that positive affect enhances the objective quality (e.g. 
efficiency and accuracy) of complex decision making (see Isen, 2004, for a review). 
However, relatively little is known about the influence of positive affect on decision 
satisfaction. Related social psychological research on satisfaction suggests that 
thorough, deliberate decision-making may actually impair satisfaction for complex 
decisions (e.g. Wilson, Lisle, Schooler, Hodges, Klaaren, & LaFleur, 1993; 
Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006). The present study tested the hypothesis that positive 
affect would buffer against dissatisfaction for complex decisions. Seventy-nine 
undergraduate students, randomly assigned to receive a positive affect induction or 
not, completed a hypothetical decision using a decision matrix and completed a 
subsequent measures of satisfaction. Results failed to support the hypothesis. 
Limitations and potential follow-up studies are discussed.
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 CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine that you are trying to purchase a new home theater system. You walk 
into your local electronics mega-store and see no fewer than twenty options, each of 
which can be assessed on at least 30 objective attributes, ranging from the number of 
digital audio inputs to the subwoofer wattage. With over 600 potential pieces of 
information to process in this decision and a minimal probability of selecting the best 
system by chance alone, would careful consideration of your options enhance the 
quality of your eventual choice? The short answer, according to normative models of 
decision making which focus on objective decision quality (i.e. accuracy), is a 
resounding yes. However, the notion that more information about options will improve 
decision making has recently been called into question by social psychological 
research examining subjective decision quality, or satisfaction. 
An overwhelming amount of research evidence suggests that acquiring and 
deliberating over vast amounts of information while making a decision may 
undermine resulting satisfaction with one's choice (e.g. see Wilson et al., 1993; 
Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006; Schwartz, Ward, Monterosso, Lyubomirsky, White, 
& Lehman, 2002). What remains unclear is a panacea for the deleterious effects of 
'overthinking' in decision making, aside from reverting to heuristic approaches to 
deciding. 
Research on pre-decisional affect states may offer alternative solutions to the 
paradox of complex decisions, that more choices, and thus more information, may 
result in dissatisfaction. In particular, positive affect may hold the key to preserved 
satisfaction given that it has been shown to engender flexible, efficient, and accurate 
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patterns of decision-making (e.g. Isen & Means, 1983; Isen, Rosenzweig, & Young, 
1991). However, while the flexible and broad cognitive processing afforded by 
positive affect has been shown to enhance the objective quality, i.e. accuracy, of 
decisions, no known study has examined the influence of positive affect on subjective 
decision quality, i.e. satisfaction. Would positive affect also counteract the ill effects 
of complex decision making on satisfaction? The present study tested this very notion. 
 Post-decision satisfaction is attenuated by conscious, deliberate, and 
maximizing strategies. For example, Dijksterhuis and van Olden (2006) demonstrated 
how conscious evaluation of choices can undermine satisfaction. In their study college 
students were presented with hypothetical decisions for one of four apartments, each 
defined by 12 attributes presented one-by-one at random on a computer screen. After 
viewing the information for the apartments, individuals were either given 4 minutes to 
engage in conscious deliberation about the options, or they completed a cognitively 
demanding distracter task (N-Back) for an equivalent period of time. Participants in 
the deliberation group were significantly less satisfied with their choices than those in 
the distraction group, even though they, ostensibly, had more resources to 'choose 
wisely.' In another line of research, Wilson and colleagues (1993) found that 
introspection, that is, consciously deliberating over the reasons for selecting one 
option over another, can significantly reduce satisfaction vis-à-vis snap judgments. In 
their study, college students who introspected about their choices after selecting 
posters were less satisfied than those who did not introspect. Experimental findings 
such as these are complemented by studies on stable patterns of decision-making 
which demonstrate that individuals who habitually engage in such effortful 
consideration of alternatives before and after deciding--so-called maximizers--report 
being significantly less satisfied with their choices (e.g. Iyengar, Wells, & Schwartz, 
2006). Although self-reported maximizers made objectively better decisions when 
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choosing jobs (as evidenced by greater salaries), they were ultimately less satisfied 
with their choices than their satisficing counterparts—individuals who habitually 
chose a ‘good enough’ option. 
 Whereas such forms of 'overthinking' have deleterious effects on satisfaction, 
contrasting strategies, including snap judgments (Wilson et al., 1993), unconscious 
processing (Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006), and satisficing, or choosing options 
which reach a threshold of acceptability (Schwartz et al., 2002), have been found to 
increase satisfaction. These findings suggest that for certain decisions, the use of "fast 
and frugal heuristics" (e.g. see Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999) 
may not only enhance the objective accuracy of decisions, but also the subjective 
quality. 
 Additionally, decision satisfaction may be attenuated by mounting decision 
complexity. In a series of elegant studies, Iyengar and Lepper (2000) demonstrated 
that college students in an ostensibly neutral mood were less satisfied when making 
decisions with an extreme number of choices (e.g. 24 varieties of jam) than were other 
students who chose from a more limited set of options (6 varieties). Schwartz (2000) 
proposed that complex decisions impair satisfaction through a variety of means, from 
overwhelming information processing capacity to enhancing perceived opportunity 
costs to raising expectations for the quality of the eventual selection. Given the 
increasing complexity of modern decision making, is there any hope for preserved 
satisfaction aside from reverting to a heuristic approach?  The answer may lie not in 
the cognitive strategy one uses to approach a decision, but rather one's mood at the 
time of choosing. 
 Positive affect has been shown to activate a wider network of cognitions 
available to consciousness (e.g. Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005) and promote flexible 
and open thinking in general. Individuals experiencing experimentally induced mild 
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positive affect demonstrate improved cognitive flexibility through varied and non-
typical responses to neutral words (Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson, 1985), flexible, 
broadened categorizations of words (Isen & Daubman, 1984), and inclusive 
categorizations of individuals (Dovidio Gaertner, Isen, & Lowrance, 1995). Positive 
affect also enhances creative thinking, as evidenced by improved performance on the 
Remote Associates Test (RAT; Mednick, Mednick, & Mednick, 1964), and fosters 
innovative solutions to tests of functional fixedness (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 
1987). 
 More specifically, research by Isen and colleagues suggests that positive affect 
enhances the quality and efficiency of complex judgments and decisions.  For 
example, college students under positive affect making hypothetical decisions about 
cars were more likely to engage in an elimination-by-aspects strategy (Isen & Means, 
1983). That is, participants induced to feel positive affect implemented a decision 
strategy that required fewer cognitive resources and less time than a maximizing 
strategy, and enabled them to rule out alternatives which did not pass a threshold of 
acceptability for important attributes. Crucially, although individuals who were 
induced to feel good engaged in quasi-satisficing and processed less information than 
those who were in a neutral mood, their accuracy did not suffer, indicating that their 
decisions were made in a more efficient manner. A later study by Isen, Rosenzweig, 
and Young (1991) found that positive affect likewise enhanced the efficiency, though 
not accuracy, of physicians who were asked to diagnose lung cancer in hypothetical 
patients. Positive affect subjects arrived at the correct answer faster than participants 
in the control condition, and they were more thorough than their neutral counterparts, 
as evidenced by their willingness to complete additional diagnoses beyond those in the 
experimental task. 
 Would the flexible and efficient form of thinking engendered by positive affect 
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buffer against dissatisfaction that is the sometimes by-product of complex decision-
making? The present study tested this hypothesis using an experimentally induced 
mood state and a controlled decision task. Of particular interest was the impact of mild 
positive affect, a common and seemingly innocuous mood that no doubt tinges 
numerous decisions and has been shown to enhance cognitive abilities in a variety of 
domains (for a review see Isen, 2004). 
In the present study, college students were asked to choose one of four 
hypothetical vacations after selecting and reading information about the vacations. 
Half of the participants were randomly assigned to receive a positive affect induction, 
a bag of candy, while the other half did not receive the manipulation. Additionally, 
participants were randomly assigned to complete either a relatively simple decision (4 
options with 4 attributes per option) or a complex decision (4 options with 12 
attributes per option). It was predicted that as the amount of information available to, 
or acquired by, participants increased, satisfaction would not suffer for participants 
under positive affect as it would for participants in a relatively neutral state. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants  
Seventy-nine undergraduate students (63 females, 16 males) participated in 
exchange for course extra credit. Participant ages ranged from 18-23 years (M = 19.81 
years). Participants were recruited via in-class announcements and a recruitment 
website for a study on decision-making.  
Materials  
Apparatus. Participants completed all study materials on a desktop computer 
with a 17” LCD monitor (Dell E177) running E-Prime Software (version 2.0 Beta). 
Responses were made using a keyboard and touchscreen affixed to the monitor 
(KeyTec Magic Touch 1700).  
Measures  
Affect. Participants’ affect was assessed immediately prior to, and following, 
the decision task using an electronic version of the Affect Grid (Russell, Weiss, & 
Mendelsohn, 1989), a single-item measure of valence and arousal. Affect was 
operationalized as the summed composite of valence and arousal.  
Subjective Decision Quality. A single-item measure of choice satisfaction was 
administered immediately after participants completed their selections: “How satisfied 
are you with your choice?” Participants indicated their responses using a 7-point 
Likert scale, from 1 - “not at all” to 7 - “extremely satisfied.” 
Revised Maximization Scale. A six-item version of Schwartz’s Maximization 
Scale (Schwartz et al., 2002) was administered to participants at the end of the study to 
assess their habitual approaches to decision making in relation to their observed 
 6
strategies on the decision task. Schwartz and colleagues (2002) have demonstrated that 
individuals who report maximizing tendencies in decision making—who habitually 
seek the best possible alternative—experience reduced satisfaction with their decisions 
relative to individuals who report satisficing, or choosing options based on a threshold 
of acceptability. 
Decision Matrix. Participants acquired information and made their decisions 
using an electronic decision matrix with vacation options presented along the x-axis 
and attributes along the y-axis (see Appendix). Participants viewed information for 4 
hypothetical vacations (Vacation A, B, C & D), each defined by either 4 attributes 
(simple decision) or 12 (complex). The options were designed such that there was one 
dominating alternative (vacation B) with 75% positive attributes, 2 options (Vacations 
A & C) with 50% positive attributes, and one dominated alternative (Vacation D) with 
25% positive attributes. Initially, the information within the grid was concealed; 
however, upon selecting a cell via the touchscreen the corresponding information 
displayed for 3 seconds before disappearing. Each participant was given an unlimited 
amount of time to gather information about the options by touching the space in the 
grid corresponding to the option and attribute of interest. Additionally, participants 
were able to view as many or as few pieces of information (including repeats) as they 
wished. Participants indicated their desired choice by selecting the corresponding 
option name on the touchscreen.  
Procedure  
Participants were seated individually in front of a computer and informed that 
all instructions and components of the study would be presented via the LCD monitor. 
Participants randomly assigned to the positive affect condition then received a small 
gift of 10 assorted hard candies wrapped in a cellophane bag as a token of appreciation 
for participating. Participants in the neutral condition received no such gift prior to the 
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study. All participants then completed an electronic Affect Grid (Russell et al., 1989) 
as a manipulation check. Next, each participant was provided on-screen instructions 
for the decision grid and completed the decision task. Upon making their decision, 
participants rated their satisfaction and affect (using the Affect Grid), and provided 
demographic information. Participants then completed the revised Maximization Scale 
(Schwartz et al., 2002). Finally, participants were thanked and debriefed, and 
participants assigned to the neutral affect condition received a bag of candy before 
leaving the experiment room. The total duration of the study was approximately 15 
minutes.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
RESULTS 
 
Data Analysis 
 No effects of gender or age were predicted or observed, and will not be 
discussed further.  
Affect (Manipulation Check)  
Affect was operationalized as the composite (sum) of valence and arousal as 
measured by the Affect Grid, with higher ratings indicating more positive affect. As 
expected, participants who received a bag of candy prior to the study reported more 
positive affect (M = 11.34, SD = 2.25) than those who did not receive the candy (M 
= 10.41, SD = 2.44); t(1, 77) = 1.76, p < .05 (one-tailed). Further analysis indicated a 
marginally significant difference in valence between the positive affect conditions (M 
= 6.45, SD = 1.69) and the neutral conditions (M = 5.85, SD = 1.67); t(1, 77) = 1.57, p 
= .06 (one-tailed). However, the positive affect group did not differ from the neutral 
affect group in terms of reported arousal (Ms = 5.47 & 5.02, SDs = 1.61 & 1.96, 
respectively); t(1, 77) = 1.11, n.s. 
Proportion of Information Viewed  
A two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) conducted on the proportion of 
information viewed in the decision matrix yielded no main effect of affect; F(1, 77) = 
.07, n.s. Participants in the neutral condition viewed no less information (M = .68, SD 
= .31) than those in the positive affect condition (M = .72, SD = .36). Additionally, 
subsequent analyses indicated no main effect of affect nor an affect by complexity 
interaction on the amount or proportion of unique vs. repeated information viewed in 
the decision grid. 
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Satisfaction  
It was predicted that participants who did not receive the positive affect 
induction would report reduced satisfaction for complex relative to simple decisions. 
A two-way analysis of variance indicated no main effects of affect or complexity on 
satisfaction. Participants in the control condition did report reported reduced 
satisfaction for complex decisions (M = 5.50) relative to simple decisions (M 
= 5.89); t(1, 39) = 1.63, n.s. Participants under positive affect were likewise equally 
satisfied when making complex decisions (M = 5.90) versus simple decisions (M 
= 5.78); t(1, 36) = -.28, n.s.  
While the hypothesis of the present study addressed the interaction of affect 
with the amount of attributes presented to individuals, it became apparent during data 
analysis that a second type of complexity may have influenced individuals’ 
satisfaction with their choices: The amount of information participants selected to 
view. To investigate the potential interaction between positive affect and the amount 
of information viewed in the decision grid, separate linear regression analyses were 
conducted for each decision condition. As expected, the impact of viewing additional 
information on satisfaction diverged significantly between the affect conditions for 
complex decisions; F(1, 34) = 8.38, p < .01. Participants in the neutral affect condition 
who viewed more information in the decision matrix were less satisfied than those 
who viewed less information (β = -.42, p = .06). By contrast, satisfaction was 
positively associated with viewing additional information (β = .35, p < .005) for 
participants under positive affect. 
Maximizing/Satisficing 
 To examine the relationship between participants’ habitual approaches to 
decision making and their behavior in the decision task, an affect by complexity 
ANOVA was conducted on a composite measure of maximizing. No main effect of 
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affect nor an affect by complexity interaction emerged. Unexpectedly, a main effect of 
complexity emerged such that participants who completed a relatively complex 
decision (12 attributes per option) reported greater maximizing in daily life (M = 4.83, 
SD = .69) than those who completed a relatively simple decision (M = 4.47, SD = .82), 
F(1, 78) = 4.33, p < .05. However, these results should be taken with caution since the 
reliability of the six-item scale was poor (Cronbach’s α = .42). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 The hypothesis of the present study, that positive affect would buffer against 
dissatisfaction as decision complexity increased, was not supported by the data. 
Participants in both the positive affect and control conditions did not report reduced 
satisfaction when the number of dimensions within the decision task was increased 
from 4 to 12. This finding is inconsistent with previous work by Iyengar and Lepper 
(2000) which demonstrated that increased choice complexity undermines satisfaction. 
However, this seeming contradiction in results may stem from a crucial difference in 
the type of complexity manipulated in the present study—whereas the aforementioned 
studies manipulated the number of choices available, the present study manipulated 
the number of attributes. Future research would benefit from exploring potential 
differences in the influence of attribute versus choice complexity on subjective 
decision quality. 
An unexpected secondary result was the finding that, in the neutral condition, 
participants who viewed additional information were less satisfied with their choices, 
while participants who had received a positive affect induction were more satisfied 
when they viewed more information. This result suggests that the impact of decision 
complexity, as measured in terms of total amount of information available from which 
to base one’s decision, may differ from that of complexity in terms of information 
selected or viewed by the participant. This result may also qualify previous research 
findings (e.g. Schwartz et al., 2002) that thorough and complex decision-making has a 
uniformly negative impact on satisfaction. 
Results of the present study further indicate that the six-item Maximization 
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Scale (Schwartz et al., 2002) may be a poor measure of individual differences in 
decision strategy. In particular, participants’ reported maximizing/satisficing was 
substantially altered by the complexity of the decision they had completed prior to the 
scale. However, these results are tempered by the low reliability of the revised scale, 
suggesting that future studies should implement the full scale instead. 
Another limitation of the present study was the marginal efficacy of the affect 
induction. Although this trend was likely due to the relatively positive mood of 
participants in the neutral condition, incorporating a baseline measure of affect to the 
design, thus allowing within-subjects analysis of mood change, would rule out this 
possibility. However, the potential drawbacks of such a design are substantial: 
Completing pre- and post-induction affect measures could weaken the effect of the 
induction, since labeling emotions may reduce their influence on cognition (Keltner, 
Locke, & Audrain, 1993). 
While the present study compared positive affect against an ostensibly neutral 
control condition, other approaches examine affect at the level of discrete emotions 
(e.g. Lerner & Keltner, 2000). In light of mounting emphasis among affect researchers 
on greater specificity in analyzing emotions, future research would benefit from 
isolating the effects of discrete emotions through alternative affect inductions such as 
validated film clips (e.g. Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). Additionally, in the present 
study complexity was examined only in terms of added attributes. Another source of 
complexity in decision making is having too many choices, which has been shown to 
reduce both motivation to choose and resulting satisfaction (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). 
Future research might examine whether positive affect would alleviate these effects of 
excessive choice on subjective decision quality. 
Results from the present study failed to support the hypothesis that positive 
affect would buffer against reduced satisfaction for complex decisions. However, 
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future research employing alternative affect inductions, and manipulating choice 
complexity as well as attribute complexity is necessary before drawing conclusions as 
to the impact of affect on subjective decision quality. 
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